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Summary:
An important question involving electric utility firms is how does each firm adjust
its capital structure on '.operating strategy so as to minimize the possible adverse
impact of commission regulation upon its performance.
By using both one way and two way analysis of variance, this paper shows that dif-
ferent degrees of regulation do affect operating and financial strategies of electric
utility firms. The degree of operating leverage concept is used as a measure of
operating elasticity, both balance sheet and income statement leverage ratios were
used as indices of financial strategy. It was found that different degrees of utility
regulation do affect a firm's operating leverage different regulation also causes a
firm to adjust it l s financial leverage in terms of /Xi to neutralize business risks,
to some extent. In addition, strong time effects associated with both operation
elasticity and capital structure are also observed.

SOME EFFECTS OF UTILITY REGULATION
ON FIRM OPERATING ELASTICITY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
It is important to examine the effect of utility regulation on the
financial behavior of firms, but one important avenue of inquiry has
remained unexplored. That is, regulation is not a homogeneous commodity
and all regulated firms are not subjected to the same degree of regula-
tion. This condition raises an important question. That is, if the
quality of regulation differs among the regulatory regimes faced by the
individual firms operating in different states, how does each firm adjust
its capital structure and operating strategy so as to minimize the pos-
sible adverse impact of that regulation on its performance. That inquiry
is the main purpose of this study; that is, do differences in regulatory
regimes faced by regulated firms affect their capital structure and
operating elasticity?
The plan of this paper is as follows. The second section reviews
previous studies; the third section develops the theoretical base for
this paper; the fourth section presents empirical studies developed to
test the relevant hypotheses; finally, a summary of the results is
presented.
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES
The landmark study by Modigliani and Miller (M & M) (1958) examined
electric utility firms and discussed risk class of securities caused by
the variability of earnings streams. Modigliani and Miller's (1958,
1963, 1965 and 1966) studies are all concerned with other matters and
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they are not explicitly concerned with the effect of different types of
regulatory regimes on the degree of homogeneity with a risk, class.
Boness and Frankfurter (1977) are somewhat critical of M & M and
question whether risk class should be associated with industry. They
examine what they term "the believed-to-be most homogeneous of industries,
electric utilities." They conclude that the results of their tests are
convincingly at variance with the notion that the electric utility industry
is a homogeneous population. They conclude:
Simply the M & M choice, as that of many others' using the
definition of electric utilities (or any other "industry"
for that matter) as a surrogate for risk class, was a poor
choice.
Hite (1977) theoretically investigated the relationship among
leverage, output effects, and the M & M theorems. He argued that output,
investment and financing decisions must be optimized simultaneously.
While the Hite study is interesting, it too does not explicitly address
the questions of how operating decisions and operating strategy are
affected by utility regulation.
In another landmark study, Eiteman (1962) examined the permitted
and earned rates of return of fifteen Bell Telephone companies in the
1950-59 period. Eiteman found that "...actual rates of return to book
value of securities (that is, to original cost) ...have been highest for
companies in the reproduction-cost jurisdictions and lowest for the
companies in the original-cost jurisdictions.
Pike (1967), using electric utility data for 1961-63 found a mean
rate of return of 6.38 percent on net plant in original cost jurisdic-
tions and 6.63 percent where other valuation methods were used.
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Petersen (1976) found that the allowed rates of return and the
realized rates of return were higher for fair value firms than those
in original cost jurisdictions.
The last three studies recognize that different types of regulation
may cause differences in the level of earnings streams; yet, this possi-
bility was ignored by the M & M and Boness and Frankfurter studies.
Actually, the Boness and Frankfurter study did not address the question
of leverage and differences in leverage in a risk class. It simply
examined the M & M assumption that their sample of electric utilities
represented a homogeneous risk class in measuring capital costs. More-
over, most of the latter studies do recognize the effect of different
degrees of regulation on the. level of the earnings stream, but they do
not explicitly examine the differential impact of regulatory regimes.
Adjustments of capital structure and operating strategy could occur as
firms attempt to neutralize the effect of utility regulation on their
business and financial risk. Moreover, these different regulatory effects
may also affect the degree of homogeneity within a sample of electric
utility firms.
III. THE THEORY
The rate base is defined as the gross valuation of public utility
property, less depreciation. In electric utility rate making, the rate
base is considered as an important variable because it is at the core of
the rate determination process. The state regulatory commission must
also establish a rate of return allowable on the rate base; then that
rate is applied to the rate base to determine the return amount which
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the utility may earn. Then, the specific rate schedules for the utility
must be constructed. This indicates, therefore, that both the rate base
and the rate of return affect the earnings which the utility generates
from selling its services. The rate base is determined on the basis of
original cost, fair value, or reproduction cost depending upon the state
in which the firm is situated- State law prescribes which method is to
be used in a given state.
There is a distinct difference between original cost, fair value,
and reproduction cost methods of determining the rate base. Garfield
and Lovejoy (1964, p. 60) explain that in the original cost method the
property is valued at its cost when it was first used in a public utility
application. The procedure is historical, in a sense, because the cur-
rent market valuation of the equipment is irrelevant to its value for
rate making.
Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p. 59) explain that in fair value
valuation of a rate base the value is determined by considering three
factors: "(a) The actual cost of the property; (b) the present value
of construction...; and (c) other matters generally taken to represent
various intangibles." This technique clearly provides for a considera-
tion of the current cost of equipment in determining the value of a rate
base for rate making purposes.
The reproduction cost less depreciation rate base method of valua-
tion involves "...the cost of duplicating the existing plant at recent
or present prices, less depreciation." Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p.
63). This procedure involves a consideration of construction costs and
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price level adjustments. This approach, therefore, considers changes
in the value of money caused by inflation or deflation.
There are arguments advanced for and against the use of each of
these three methods of rate base valuation; see Garfield and Lovejoy
(1964, p. 58-65). The facts remain, however, that one of these methods
is used in each state regulatory jurisdiction. It is obvious (from
footnote 1) that each of these three methods of rate base determination
will permit the firm to generate a different earnings stream or revenue
requirement. Realized rates of return should be highest for reproduction
cost jurisdictions and lowest for firms in original cost jurisdictions.
Firms in fair value jurisdictions should generate rates of return in
2between original cost and reproduction costs.
As mentioned above, the relative profitability among firms operating
in different regulatory regimes has been intensively tested by different
scholars. However, previous studies have not investigated the possible
differences of operating elasticity among firms facing different types of
regulation. The operating elasticity is generally defined as the percent-
age change of profit with respect to percentage charge of sales. This is
an index indicating the tendency for the profitability of a firm to in-
crease as sales increase with a particular level of production capacity.
In financial analysis the degree of operating leverage (DOL) is generally
used to measure the operating elasticity. The DOL concept will be empiri-
cally analyzed for the firms in the sample facing different regulatory
regimes. It should be noted that the relation associated with the DOL
will hold if and only if the appropriate functions are linear. -The
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justif ication of this issue for the electric utility industry will be
explored in the following section.
Total risks faced by a firm may be divided into business risks and
financial risks. The market movements and values of common stock reflect
'
'it .Li' ... '•: • •:•.
both the potential return, from the investors point of view, as well as
the perceptions of the risks involved in those financial investments.
If one examines the motivation of stock investors, he finds that inves-
tors in utility equity investments place emphasis in the stability of
the income stream; in addition, these investors clearly have preference
for dividend return rather than capital gain. As the dividend payment
for a firm is a function of the earning stream, a firm with a relatively
certain income stream will have a relative stable dividend policy.
Therefore, financial managers in the electric utility industry may
generally adjust their financial strategies according to the regulatory
regime they face to assure that both stable earning streams and dividend
payments over time can be maintained.
Since the consumer's demand curve for electricity is not perfectly
inelastic, there is a consumption response to price changes or price
differences. When prices of a commodity are raised, the consumer reduces
his consumption because of the substitution effect and the income effect.
The income effect means that the higher (lower) price reduces (increases)
the real income of the buyer. Moreover, the substitution effect means
that the higher flower) price decreases (increases) the relative attrac-
tiveness of a commodity and makes the consumer willing to buy less (more)
of it. One should expect more volatility in the income stream of an
electricity firm under fair value, and reproduction cost jurisdictions
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than in original cost jurisdictions, mainly because of the nature of
the regulatory process. The logic of this statement follows.
If one examines the rate base methods mentioned above, one finds
that the original cost method is less cluttered with estimates and sub-
jective judgment in its implementation of the regulatory procedure; the
fair value method is next in its degree of subjective judgment and the
reproduction cost method involves more estimates and subjective judgment
than the other two. It is a combination of this subjective judgment and
the probability of inconsistent estimates which yields the highest busi-
ness risks for reproduction costs jurisdictions, the next highest for
fair value, and the lowest: for original cost jurisdictions. The more
subjective estimation methods will yield less consistent prices and more
consumer changes in consumption as was mentioned above. These adjust-
ments also affect rates of return earned by the firms and, all other
things equal, cause differences in business risk. Firms facing more
volatile earnings streams may generally use less financial leverage to
make its total risks equal to that of firms with lower business risks.
This argument is based upon th»= assumption that an electric utility
firm would like to hare a net earning stream available to cceeoii stock
holder at least as stable as the other firms within the same industry.
In addition, the regulator tends to believe that the total risk for
electric utility firms are similar. Consequently, one would expect to
find a lesser use of leverage in reproduction cost regimes, the highest
usage of financial leverage in original cost regimes, and the fair value
3
regimes would be in between these two extremes. In sum, the managers
of electric utility companies facing different regulatory regimes may
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adjust capital structures to make the total risk of their companies
comparable to other electric companies competing for the same type of
investors. It should be noted that whether the financial managers
associated with different regulation regimes have, in fact, adjusted
their company's capital structure is an empirical issue. Hence, the
possible differences of both the DOL and the capital structure among
different regulatory regimes will be empirically tested in the following
section.
IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
4
Data from fifty-nine electric utility firms during 1958-75 are
used to investigate the effects of different types of regulation on the
operating and financial strategy of firms in the electric utility indus-
try. Appendix A shows that the sample consisted of 34 firms regulated
by original cost rates base jurisdictions, 19 firms regulated by a fair
value rate base jurisdiction, and 6 firms from reproduction cost rate
base jurisdictions. A data summary is presented in Appendix B. The
sample was selected from the electric utility firms listed in the Compustat
utility tape. Firms operating in more than one state were eliminated
because they were regulated by different regulatory bodies. This procedure
avoided the joint effect on a single firm caused by different rate base
methods being used in different states. Holding companies were also
excluded. Some electric firms also sell natural gas; therefore, within
the sample for each rate base method, roughly the same proportion of firms
sold both gas and electricity as those selling only electricity. This
approach was used to reduce the market power problem caused when firms
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face no competition from substitute fuel when they sell both gas and
electricity in a single market. To reveal the dynamic nature of the
impact of different regulatory regimes, data for 18 years, 1958-75 were
used in the analysis.
The possible impact of different regulation on the operating elas-
ticity of the electric utility firms was evaluated by examining the
degree of operating leverage. Following Hunt (1961), Mao (1969), and
Weston and Brigham (1975) the degree of operating leverage (DOL) can be
defined as:
DOL =
P( Q"V)
P(Q-V)-FC (1)
where: P = market price per unit of product
V = variable cost per unit of product
Q = total quantity of goods sold
FC = total fixed operating cost
Based upon the break-even formula, DOL can be rewritten as:
DOL = L- (2)
FC
where Q* = ^—=jr is the break-even point. Equation (2) indicates that
the DOL is determined by the magnitude of both Q* and Q. If firm A's
DOL is higher than the DOL of firm B, this implies that the percentage
of profit increase from a one percent increase of net sales for firm A
will be higher than that of firm B.
This approach to DOL, of course, assumes linearity in the total
revenue and total cost functions. The discussion below shows that this
is not an unreasonable assumption. When examining the cost curve for
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electrical generation, J. Johnston (1960) reported that marginal and
average variable cost are constant over the relevant range of output
in the short run. While he was less confident in his long-run estimates,
because of severe defects in available data on capital costs, he reported
that long-run average costs fall quickly and steeply and then approximates
a horizontal straight line. Both of these results offer strong empirical
support for linear cost curves. Note that both break-even and DOL types
of analyses are short-run instead of long-run in nature [See Adar, Barnea,
and Lev (1977)].
Joel Dean (1975, p. 5) criticized conventional economic theory which
argues for a cost function which is not linear. Dean's analyses are all
short-run in nature. Dean's solid empirical work has stood the test of
time and he is responsible for the discovery that manufacturing firms
have constant horizontal statistical marginal cost curves. He explains
that a new theory is necessary to explain this linear cost behavior
which is a fact clearly confirmed by his statistical studies.
Dean's explanation of the linearity of the total cost function
includes segmentation of equipment, limited substitutability of variable
inputs for fixed inputs and limited substitutability among variable in-
puts. The non-linear cost curves of economic theory ignore these
features of production (Dean 1975, p. 34). The essential point in the
segmentation of equipment is that the fixed factor is divisible and this
segmentation causes marginal manufacturing costs to remain constant over
a wide range of output. Dean explains that this condition stems from
the ability of a firm to use only the necessary part of the total capacity
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of equipment by shutting down those units which are not needed because
demand is at some level below full plant capacity.
Limited substitutability in the short-run between fixed and variable
input factors is another factor influencing linear behavior of cost func-
tions. "In modern industrial processes this [type of substitution] is
largely a fiction in the short run" Dean (1975, p. 34). The absence of
this substitutability tends to make the marginal cost curve linear, which
means that each additional unit produced adds an identical amount to
total cost.
The third explanation for linear marginal cost functions is that in
a modern factory restraints of: (1) production technology, (2) standard
shop practices, (3) union work rules, and (4) social mores, actually limit
the substitutability of variable inputs. Economic theory assumes un-
limited substitution (Dean, 1975). This feature, too, combined with the
first two adjustments to production processes, causes marginal cost to
remain constant over a wide range of output* The above arguments by
Dean as well as the empirical work by Johnston seem to adequately support
the proposition that a linear total variable cost function is a very .
reasonable assumption in the electric utility industry.
On the revenue side, there seems to be equally strong support for
a linear total revenue function. A set of published graphical presenta-
tions shew that total revenue from electricity sales to residential,
commercial, and industrial customers seemed to approximate a linear
pattern between 1963 and 1973 (FPC. 1973, pp. LIII-LV)*,
Together t the above evidence seems to justify the ass-inaption of a
linear total variable cost and total revenue relationship used in this
analysis of DOL.
To investigate the impact of different regulatory regimes on firm's
earnings elasticity , DOL*s were calculated for fifty-nine firms during
1958-1975. Analysis of variance [ANOVA] statistical technique was used
to test whether the DQL's for firms operating in fair value, original
cost, and reproduction cost regulatory regimes were significantly dif-
ferent.
First the ANOVA is used to test whether the average DOL is different
among the three regulatory regimes,, in each year. The null and alterna-
tive hypotheses can be defined as
a = p.. = vu = p
o It 2.x. 3t
(3)
d. = not all average DOL's are equal
£3.
tfa
where u. = the average DOL for original cost regime in t year,
xt
u„ = the average DOL for fair value regime in t ~ year,
th
H, = the average DOL for the replacement cost regime t year.
During the sample period, there exists 34 s 19 and 6 firms for orig~
inal cost, fair value and reproduction cost regimes respectivley [See
Appendix A] . Therefore, the number of observations is not equal for each
separate group included in the sample, however s Meter and Wasserman (1974,
Chapter 13) have shown that it is not necessary to have an equal n&mber of
observations within each group to utilise one-way ANOVA technique. To-
test the statistical hypotheses, as indicated in equation (3) 9 we need the
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info relation associated with sum of squares, degrees of freedom, mean
squares for both between group and within group to calculate the F
value* The ANOVA table for both 1955 and 1975 are presented in Table
la, By comparing the computed F value with the table value, it is found
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% level of confidence
for both 1955 and 1975. However, the null hypothesis can be rejected
at the 10% level of confidence for both 1955 and 1975* It should be
noted that the ANOVA results for other years can be interpreted in a
similar way as is indicated here*
The F values listed in Table 1 reveal that the DGL's are signifi-
cantly different among different regulation regimes at the 5%, 10%, or
15% significant level for 14 out of 18 years. The average DOL (DOL)
figure listed in Table 1 shows that the DOL's associated with fair
value valuation are always higher than those of original cost regimes*
This implies that firms under fair value regulation tend to generate
higher operating elasticity than firms under original cost jurisdictions.
This reflects a differential response of the change of profit with re-
spect to the change of sales within each regulatory regime. The implica-
tions of this finding are now discussed, The DOL is determined by the
change of both Q and Q*; and Q* is determined by FC S P and V. Both Q
and FC are decision variables which are generally affected by operating
strategy of firms. Hence, the conclusion is that a firm's operating
strategy is not independent of the regulatory regimes it faces.
Chang and Lee (1977) have used pooled time-series and cross-section
data to show the importance of time effects in financial analysis. To
incorporate the time effect into the model , a two-way ANOVA is used
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to analyze the DOL for 59 firms during 1955-1975. The results are shown
in Table 1c. Methodologically, the randomized Block Design is used to
ascertain the independence of the error components. The sample sizes
associated with the case being examined are unequal; however, the frequen-
cies are proportional and therefore; the method used to calculate the
variance component is identical to the equal sample size two-way ANOVA.
[See Neter and VJasserman (1974, Chapter 19)3* From Table ic, it is fouud
that both the time factor and interaction factor are significant at the
one percent level and the group factor is significant at the ten percent
level.
Two different measures of leverage were used to investigate the
impact of different degrees of regulation on electric utility company's
financing strategy (or capital structure). Following Krainer (1977) and
Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) both the income statement and the
balance sheet measures of leverage were used to make this empirical test.
The first leverage measure is defined as total interest charges of firm
i (li) divided to total returns for firm i (Xi) [Ii/Xi]; the second leverage.
measure is defined as total book value of long-term debt for firm i (Di)
Un-
divided by total book value of asset (Ai) f-rrj . The analysis of
' Ax
variance technique was again used to determine the extent of differences
in leverage among firms operating in the three different regulatory
regimes. Table 2 reveals that there were really no differences in
leverage among firms operating in the three different regimes for all
18 years when the Di/Ai definition is used. However, if the Ii/Xi
definition is used (see Table 3), significant differences exist among
firms in the three different regimes for 9 of the years included in
the sample. It is appropriate to consider the relative advantages
of the two different definitions of leverage. —™- and ~r» Miller and
Ai Xi
Modigliani (1958) defined 1 average as the ratio between market value of
debt .and market value of equity. Miller ana Kodigliani (1963) argued that
tt~ can be used as an alternative leverage measure» It is clear that
AX
the definition of -r™ is umch closer than -—• to M & M 5 s original theo-
Xx Ai °
retieal concept ox leverage if the margins'] corporate tax rate is not zero,
Krainer (1977) discussed the advantage of using
-st- as the leverage
measure, lie considers Xi a more natural measure for bond holders since
a going concern's operating income, >'..
„
is the ultimate source for
fulfilling the bond contract, In addition, Krainer argued that over
tixse changes in the interest rate might itself be concealed in the
debt~equity rat io«
Table 2 also shows that the P>/A''s for the electric utility firm are
around forty-five percent. This figure is nearly identical to the Re.il
System's optimal capital structure. In the parenthesis associated with
overall D/A is the D/A with current, debt as part of total debt* The
results show that current debt of electric utility firms is approximately
2-3 percent.
Table 3 shows that firms facing original coj,r. regimes except in 1975,
have the highest ~r; and the vrr f s of firms regulsted by fair value
A3 A3
regimes is higher than those of firms confronting reproduction cost re-
gimes for 12 of 3 8 years. If interest charges are similar for a!3 three
regimes, then the different .-~L- my wen be because regulation by repro-
AX
duction cost regimes is more libera] than that of either original cost
-I 6-
or fair value regimes; and the regulation for fair value is more liberal
9
than that of original cost regitr»es } as found by Petersen (19/6).
Implications of different results associated with two alternative
leverage ratio measures as indicated in Tables 2 and 3 can be explored
further. First., if two firms have different rates of return* then the
income statement leverage ratio meaoure (Wr-) instead of the balance
Di
sheet type ox .leverage ratio measure (-ry) should be used to measure the
Jidegree of financial risk. This argument is based upon the fact that -—- is
.A.X
IT
a better proxy relative to — tor measuring the potential of a firm to
fulfill its obligation to the creditor over time* Secondly, our empiri-
cal work shows relatively low leverage ratios in terms of =r associated
with fair value regimes relative to original cost regimes. This indicates
that firms under fair value jurisdictions have lowered their financial
risk to make their total risk compatible to the total risk associated
with firms under original cost jurisdictions* Final iy, this analysis
also implies that the empirical results obtained by Gale (1972),. Hurdle
hi I''(1974) and others using ~~ instead of ^r as a proxy for financial risk
Ax Xi r J
may require, sosne reexamination. Incidentally , data show that most of the
long term debt of the utility industry is mortgage debt. The implica-
tion of mortgage debt (secured debt) on the value of a firm can be found
in a recent: analysis by Scott (197?) *
A two-x-ray A.KOVA model was used to test the time effect, the group
effect j and the interaction effects in both ~r and -rr* The same sample,
Xj_ Ai
tir e periods, and design method as used in the two-way ANOVA for DOL
analysis was usee in these, tests. The results are -presented in Tables 4
and 5.
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In the =r- analysis, Table 4 indicates that both time effects
and interaction effects are statistically significant at the one percent
level. However, the group effect alone is not statistically significant.
For the — analysis, Table 5 shows that only the time effect is sta-
tistically significant at the one percent level.
The results presented in Table 4 and 5 reveal that both the income
statement and the balance sheet measures of leverage change over time.
However, the balance sheet type of leverage measure is not different for
firms regulated by different regulatory regimes. Moreover, the income
statement type of measure is different for firms operating in different
regulatory regimes. It should be noted, however, that the difference is
caused by the interaction of time and the different regulatory regimes.
The analyses of this section reveal that the different degrees of
regulation, as reflected by the different regulatory regimes, do change
the DOL and cause some adjustments to the financial strategy of electric
utility firms. This conclusion may have some implications on Boness
and Frankfurter's findings about the heteroscedastic nature of utility
firms within the utility industry.
Boness and Frankfurter (1977) discussed fifty-one of the fifty-four
firms included in the Miller and Modigliani (1966) study. Of the fifty-
one firms used by Boness and Frankfurter, we were able to classify without
ambiguity forty-three according to the rate base method used in states
in which they operate. We eliminated Texas firms, which were regulated
at the local level, and firms operating in states where rate base methods
could not be identified with a high level of accuracy. Our classifi-
cation shows that the M & M sample firms face at least three different
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regulatory regimes. Some firms in M & M' s and in our sample produced both
electricity and natural gas. From the market power theory developed
by Hurdle (1974), it can be argued that firms producing both electricity
and natural gas will have market power to generate more profit than
those firms selling only one of these products. This may be an additional
reason for Boness and Frankfurter's findings; market power differences
generally make firms dissimilar, even if they are in the same industry.
V. SUMMARY
By using both one way and two way analysis of variance, this paper
has shown that different degrees of regulation do affect operating and
financing strategies of electric utility firms. The degree of operating
leverage concept is used as a measure of operating elasticity; both
balance sheet and income statement leverage ratios were used as indices
of financing strategy. It was found that different degrees of utility
regulation do affect a firm's operating leverage; different regulation
also causes a firm to adjust its financial leverage in terms of Ii/Xi
to neutralize business risk, to some extent. In addition, strong time
effects associated with both operation elasticity and capital structure
have also been observed in this study.
-19-
Table 1-a
Analysis of Variance - DOL Arranged by Rate Base Method
(1958 and 1975)
1958
Degree of Sum of Mean
Component Freedom Squares Square F
Between-group
means 2 .517155 .258578 2.8179*
Wi thin-group
means 56 5.138740 .091763
Total 58 5.655895
1975
Degree of Sum of Mean
Component Freedom Squares Squares F
Between-group
means 2 .598972 .299436 2.6945*
Within-group
means 56 6.223110 .111127
Total 58 6.822082
*<5is gnificant at 10% level
-20-
Table 1-b
Average DOL and the F values
DOL F statistics
Overal
1
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 2.3325 2.2463 2.4472 2.3867 2.8179*
1959 2.2922 2.2213 2.3988 2.3574 2.7447*
1960 2.2804 2.2020 2.3856 2.3910 2.9418*
1961 2.2867 2.2001 2.3996 2.4169 3.1125**
1962 2.2665 2.1998 2.3627 2.3389 1.6630
1963 2.2517 2.1683 2.3848 2.3027 2.7558*
1964 2.2274 2.1385 2.3682 2.2852 3.3436**
1965 2.1757 2.0935 2.2982 2.2538 3.2999**
1966 2.1299 2.0569 2.2185 2.2633 2.8257*
1967 2.0967 2.0343 2.1682 2.2241 2.0121*-
1968 2.1063 2.0414 2.1796 2.2426 2.282 8*-
1969 2.0569 1.9945 2.1414 2.1427 2.1569*-
1970 1.9864 1.9458 2.0635 1.9729 1.3475
1971 1.9776 1.9515 2.0414 1.9237 .8723
1972 1.9643 1.9294 2.0608 1.8567 2.2110*-
1973 1.9717 1.9493 2.0685 1.7920 2.4049*
1974 1.9512 1.9239 2.0613 1.7570 1.9150
1975 1.9716 1.9499 2.0851 1.7343 2.6945*
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
*- Significant at 15% level
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Table 2
Average value of —r and the F Statistics
Di
Ai F statistics
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 45.60 (47.29)* 45.72 45.98 43.71 .5255
1959 45.09 (47.06) 45.01 45.76 43.42 .8313
1960 44.89 (46.43) 45.01 44.90 44.19 .1004
1961 45.22 (47.04) 45.43 45.61 42.83 1.0352
1962 44.33 (45.65) 44.32 44.56 43.69 .0917
1963 43.71 (45.50) 43.34 44,45 43.42 .2870
1964 43.30 (45.39) 43.19 43.73 42.53 .1691
1965 42.97 (45.60) 43.21 43.07 41.28 .4060
1966 43.41 (46.95) 43.47 44.40 39.97 1.3751
1967 43.86 (48.14) 43.30 45.25 42.67 .6495
1968 44.74 (49.68) 44.85 45.75 40.95 1.3953
1969 44.84 (50.70) 45.09 45.10 42.65 .4807
1970 46.76 (51.29) 46.28 47.10 48.40 .7256
1971 46.79 (51.09) 46.74 46.97 46.51 .0480
1972 45.55 (50.33) 45.07 46.41 45.48 .6324
1973 44.80 (49.81) 44.35 45.14 46.34 .6162
1974 42.66 (46.53) 43.25 42.73 43.00 .3595
1975 43.75 (48.19) 44.01 43.03 44.54 .5897
*For the
-T-r values in parentheses, the Di value includes current liabilities.
Ai ^ '
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Table 3
Average Value of — and the F Statistics
Al
(li/Xi ) F statistics
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 17.34% ; 7. 90% 16.53% 16.77% .5270
1959 17.03 17.59 16.42 15.77 .4317
1960 16.98 17.33 16.89 14.97 .6248
1961 17.29 18.12 16.67 14.54 2.6380*
1962 17.02 17.80 16.43 14.42 2.3609*
1963 16.94 17.58 16.76 13.90 1.9551*-
1964 16.88 17.68 16.59 13.23 2.4940*
1965 17.16 18.26 16.72 12.32 3.7811**
1966 17.91 19.09 17.65 12.02 5.3705**
1967 19.75 20.78 19.89 13.38 4.8172*
1968 21.50 22.50 21.64 15.40 3.0557*
1969 24.87 25.70 24.98 19.80 1.5019
1970 30.50 31.91 28.95 27.44 .8227
1971 33.74 35.99 29.95 32.97 1.6098
1972 33.27 34.42 31.44 32.53 .7418
1973 36.11 37.36 34.01 35.71 .6184
1974 42.86 43.53 39.45 49.82 1.7330
1975 38.12 39.02 34.80 43.55 1.9969*-
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
*- Significant at 15% level
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FOOTNOTES
*The authors acknowledge, with thanks, very helpful suggestions for
improvement by an anonymous referee.
Rates of return are generally determined by the cost of capital.
See Petersen (1976) for details. The regulatory process specifies rele-
vant costs and expenses which may be recovered by the utility firm as
services are priced to the buyer. The revenue requirement, that is the
revenue that the utility is authorized to collect, may be defined as
follows. See Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p. 44) for the following
treatment:
^
(1) Revenue requirement = cost of service(2)RR=E+d+T+ (V-W)R
where: RR = revenue requirement
E = operating expense
d = depreciation expense
T = taxes
V = gross valuation of the property serving the public
W = accrued depreciation
R = rate of return (a percentage)
(V-W) = rate base (net valuation)
(V-W)R = return amount, or earnings allowed on the rate base
2
These results are expected from theory and confirmed by Eiteman
(1962, p. 39).
3
In analyzing leverage, diversification and capital market effects
on risk-adjusted capital budgeting, Tuttle and Litzenberger (1968, pp.
428-29) have argued that the firm does have the option of neutralizing
the risk inherent in a given investment opportunity through long-term
borrowing or lending.
4
In Tables 1-b, 2 and 3, group 1 = original cost regime; group 2 =
fair value regime; and group 3 = reproduction cost regime.
Adar, Barnea, and Lev's (1977) comprehensive CVP analysis has
analyzed the economic implications of CVP and break-even analyses.
Hite (1977) has shown that cost of capital need not decline with
leverage even in perfect capital markets and with default-free debt. This
finding may be used to justify why different regulation regimes affect the
capital structure in some years and not in other years.
They use this definition to show that the higher the marginal cor-
porate tax rate and degree of leverage, the smaller the variance in after
tax revenue.
-27-
FOOTNOTES (cont.)
Q
See Scanlon (1972) for detail.
9
A more liberal regulation will generally increase a firm's total
returns. See Primeaux (1978).
The classification list is available from the authors. Primeaux
(1978) discusses the difficulty of classifying states according to rate
base methods; therefore, the procedure used by Primeaux was developed to
avoid these difficulties. The same procedure was used in this study to
assure accuracy.
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APPENDIX A
Firms Included in the Sample
(According to Rate Base Method)
Original Cost
Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Central Main Power Co.
Concord Electric Co.
Consolidated Edison Co.
Green Mountain Power Corp.
Long Island Lighting Co.
Maine Public Service
New York State Electric & Gas
Niagra Mohawk Power Corp.
Orange & Rockland Utilities.
Pacific Gas & Electric
Public Service Co. of Colorado
Rochester Gas & Electric
San Diego Gas & Electric
Southern California Edison
United Illuminating Co.
Boston Edison Co.
Central Louisiana Electric Co.
Consumer's Power Co.
Detroit Edison Co.
Edison Sault Electric Co.
Fitchburg Gas & Electric
Florida Power & Light
Florida Power Corp.
Hawaiian Electric Co.
Kansas Gas & Electric
Kansas Power & Light
Madison Gas & Electric
Savannah Electric & Power Co.
Tampa Electric
Upper Penninsula Power Co.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
Wisconsin Power & Light
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APPENDIX A (cont.)
Fair Value
Arizona Public Service Co.
Duquesne Light Co.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Tucson Gas & Electric Co.
Atlantic City Electric Co.
Central Illinois Light Co.
Central Illinois Public Service Co.
Commonwealth Edison Co.
Illinois Power
Indianapolis Power & Light Co.
Louisville Gas & Electric Co.
Missouri Utilities Co.
Philadelphia Electric Co.
Public Service Co. of Indiana
Public Service Co. of New Mexico
St. Joseph Light & Power
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co,
UGI Corporation
Reproduction Cost
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.
_
Dayton Power & Light
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. Ohio Edison
Columbus Southern Ohio Electric Co. Toledo Edison
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APPENDIX B
Data Summary
1. Total operating revenue for firm i = PQi; data obtained Moody's Public
Utility Manual [MPUM].
2. Total variable cost for firm i = VQi; data obtained from MPUM.
3. Total operating fixed cost for firm i = FCi; data obtained from MPUM.
4. Total returns for firm i = Xi ; this variable was defined to be net
operating revenues plus taxes. Data from MPUM.
5. Total interest charges for firm i = Ii. It was defined to be interest
on long-term debt plus other interest charges. Data from MPUM.
6. Total long-term debt (or total debt) of firm i = Di. The book value
of long-term debt (or total debt) for firm i. Data obtained from MPUM.
7. Total book value of assets for firm i = Ai.
8. Rate base methods were validated by referring to 5 different sources
to assure that the correct rate base method was used in this study.
This information was obtained from Eiteman (1962). Pike (1967),
Phillips (1969), and Senate Document No. 56, 90th Congress 1st Session
State Utility Commissions Summary and Tabulation of Information
Submitted by the Commissions , and State of Arizona, Arizona Corporation
Commission Annual Report (1970).
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